清洁生产中企业与政府之间的博弈分析

清洁生产作为对产品和产品生产过程的一种全新的、持续的、创造性的思想,变被动治理污染为积极预防污染,对环境改善具有重要的意义。本文从清洁生产和博弈论入手,分析了无政府监督情况下企业清洁生产和政府监督情况下的政府与企业间的混合战略纳什均衡,最后依据博弈结果指出推动清洁生产的相关建议。     

基于演化博弈的应急医疗物资质量保障策略研究*

为保障突发公共卫生事件时应急医疗物资质量,满足医院物资需求,运用演化博弈理论构建政府、公立医院和医疗物资供应商三方博弈主体决策模型,并求解各方决策的纯策略纳什均衡解和混合策略纳什均衡解,探讨常态化和非常态化下三方博弈主体合作机制的动态演化过程。研究结果表明:减少政府监管成本并加大对医疗物资供应商的奖惩力度对供应商诚信销售效果不明显;减少供应商诚信销售成本、增加其隐性收益、加大医院投诉概率,可促使供应商诚信销售,同时提升政府公信力,最终三方博弈主体策略均收敛。研究结果可为突发公共卫生事件中保障医疗物资质量提出对策与建议。     

基于前景理论的施工安全事故网络舆论监督演化博弈分析*

为了对施工安全事故网络舆论实施有效监督,推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化,基于前景理论,构建政府、承包商和社会公众关于施工安全事故网络舆论监督演化博弈模型,利用系统动力学方法进行数值仿真。结果表明:心理作用对政府、承包商和社会公众在施工生产安全事故发生后的策略选择有较大影响;提高政府发现承包商隐瞒信息的概率及政府对承包商的处罚,能使承包商趋向于选择如实公布信息;减小公众造谣概率和增大公众舆论监督收益,能使公众趋向于选择舆论监督;公众选择网络舆论监督,能促使政府积极主动回应社会关切,促使承包商如实公布信息。     

Evaluating surrogates of genetic diversity for conservation planning

Protected-area systems should conserve intraspecific genetic diversity. Because genetic data require resources to obtain, several approaches have been proposed for generating plans for protected-area systems (prioritizations) when genetic data are not available. Yet such surrogate-based approaches remain poorly tested. We evaluated the effectiveness of potential surrogate-based approaches based on microsatellite genetic data collected across the Iberian Peninsula for 7 amphibian and 3 reptilian species. Long-term environmental suitability did not effectively represent sites containing high genetic diversity (allelic richness). Prioritizations based on long-term environmental suitability had similar performance to random prioritizations. Geographic distances and resistance distances based on contemporary environmental suitability were not always effective surrogates for identification of combinations of sites that contain individuals with different genetic compositions. Our results demonstrate that population genetic data based on commonly used neutral markers can inform prioritizations, and we could not find an adequate substitute. Conservation planners need to weigh the potential benefits of genetic data against their acquisition costs.     

多方博弈下起重作业人员有意不安全行为致因分析

为有效制定起重作业人员有意不安全行为防范措施,降低人为事故发生可能性,结合演化博弈理论,探讨不同策略选择下施工企业内部管理方、监管方及作业方的得益变化,建立各方期望效益函数;依据复制动态方程,构建多方演化博弈模型,分析各方策略选择演化趋势及均衡点,剖析作业人员有意不安全行为致因,并分别从各方角度制定作业人员有意不安全行为预防措施。结果表明:作业人员有意不安全行为不仅与自身风险、成本有关,且受管理方、监管方决策影响;管理方增加安全投入,提升作业人员事故损失承担比例;监管方选择合理监管方式严格监管作业行为;作业人员进行行为决策时权衡风险、成本、收益及各方决策,将有效减少作业人员有意不安全行为的发生。     

REAL CODED GENETIC ALGORITHM OPTIMIZATION OF LONG TERM RESERVOIR OPERATION1

ABSTRACT: An optimization and simulation model holds promise as an efficient and robust method for long term reservoir operation, an increasingly important facet of managing water resources. Recently, genetic algorithms have been demonstrated to be highly effective optimization methods. According to previous studies, a real coded genetic algorithm (RGA) has many advantages over a binary coded genetic algorithm. Accordingly, this work applies an RGA to obtain the 10‐day (the traditional period of reservoir operation in Taiwan) operating rule curves for the proposed reservoir system. The RGA is combined with an effective and flexible scheme for coding the reservoir rule curves and applied to an important reservoir in Taiwan, considering a water reservoir development scenario to the year 2021. Each rule curve is evaluated using a complex simulation model to determine a performance index for a given flow series. The process of generating and evaluating decision parameters is repeated until no further improvement in performance is obtained. Many experiments were performed to determine the suitable RGA components, including macro evolutionary (ME) selection and blend‐α crossover. Macro evolution (ME) can be applied to prevent the premature problem of the conventional selection scheme of genetic algorithm. The purpose of adjusting a of a crossover scheme is to determine the exploratory or exploitative degree of various subpopulations. The appropriate rule curve searched by an RGA can minimize the water deficit and maintain the high water level of the reservoir. The results also show that the most promising RGA for this problem consists of these revised operators significantly improves the performance of a system. It is also very efficient for optimizing other highly nonlinear systems.     

An improved grey wolf optimizer algorithm for identification and location of gas emission

Identification of the leakage of hazardous gases plays an important role in the environment protection, human health and safety of industry production. However, lots of current optimization algorithms, such as particle swarm optimization (PSO) and Grey Wolf Optimizer (GWO), suffer from poor global optimization capability and estimation accuracy. In this work, a hybrid differential evolutionary and GWO (DE-GWO) algorithm is proposed. Tested by simulation cases and Prairie Grass emission experimental data, DE-GWO shows higher estimation accuracy than GWO. Compared with the other four optimization algorithms, DE-GWO exhibits finer robust stability under different population sizes, fewer iterations, as well as higher estimation accuracy with fewer search agents. Importantly, simulation results demonstrate that DE-GWO is more suitable to apply in the scene with a small number of sensors. Therefore, the proposed in this paper outperforms other optimization algorithms for the gas emission inverse problem. DE-GWO can provide reliable estimation towards gas emission identification and positioning, which shows huge potential as the data analysis module of real-time monitoring and early warning system.     

环境分权下央地企协同减排策略演化——基于区块链技术应用视角

环境分权下，地方政府及控排企业的机会主义行为制约着降碳目标实现，而区块链技术提供了一种可信、高效的协同减排环境。为此，本研究构建了以控排企业、地方政府和中央政府为主体的演化博弈模型，探索区块链技术投入前后的协同减排策略；并借助数值仿真研究了区块链技术的监管影响系数、应用成本及地方支出系数对系统演化路径的影响。结果显示：区块链技术投入缩短了减排系统的趋稳时间；监管影响系数与中央政府对区块链技术投入的支持程度、地方及控排企业的减排参与意愿呈正相关；区块链平台应用成本与地方政府减排参与意愿呈负相关，地方支出系数与中央政府对区块链技术投入的支持程度呈正相关，且均存在最优调控区间。因此，应积极开展区块链监管试点，引导、扶持企业绿色转型，强化中央督察职能，转变地方政府发展理念，保障减排政策落地和区域经济高质量转型。     

城市生活垃圾分类强制实施背景下“一主多元”治理模式的主体策略演化分析

随着经济不断发展和人民消费水平提升，垃圾分类治理问题日益严峻。实践经验表明，强制实施背景下政府主导与承包商、公众和环保组织为核心的多元主体共同参与的“一主多元”协作模式，对于我国垃圾分类治理具有较好适用性。但该模式也存在“一主”突出、“多元”不足及其他系统性冲突。为明确多元主体参与策略对“一主多元”治理模式稳定性的影响，首先，本文分析了城市生活垃圾分类强制实施背景下该模式运行机制及主体动因。然后，构建以承包商、公众和环保组织为主体的三方演化博弈系统，对不同策略组合下系统的演化结果进行演绎。最后，借助数值仿真分析了参与成本、环境收益和政府补贴对主体策略选择及系统稳定性的影响。结果表明：环保组织参与垃圾分类治理的积极性最高，公众最低；对于系统运行风险，承包商属于风险偏好者，环保组织属于风险回避者，公众属于风险中立者；承包商对参与成本最敏感，对政府补贴最不敏感，公众则正好与之相反；环境收益的提升有助于提高多元主体的参与积极性。这些发现对于如何提升多元主体参与垃圾分类治理的积极性及“一主多元”治理模式的运行效能具有启示意义。